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Your data will never die, but you will: A comparative analysis of US and UK post-
mortem data donation frameworks  




Posthumous medical data donation (PMDD) for the purpose of legitimate, non-commercial and, 
potentially, very beneficial medical research has been sparsely discussed in legal scholarship to date. 
Conversely, quite an extensive social science and humanities research establishes benefits of this 
practice. It also finds that PMDD enables individuals to employ their altruistic motivations and 
aspirations by helping them participate in ‘citizen’s science’ and medical research, thus supporting 
efforts in finding cures for some of the acutest diseases of today.  
There appears to be no jurisdiction where a regulatory framework supports and enables PMDD. This 
paper analyses whether and to what extent law and policy should enable this practice. We take a 
comparative approach, examining the position under both US and UK law, providing the first 
comparative legal account of this practice.  
We do not aim to suggest a detailed legal solution for PMDD, but rather key considerations and 
principles for legislative/policy reforms, which would support the practice of PMDD. We discuss organ 
donation and provide a comparative outlook with the aim of drawing lessons from this practice, and 
applying them to the regulation of PMDD. Our analysis is both normative and black letter since we 
consider arguments regarding the necessity of organ and data donation, as well as the law that 
regulates these practices. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 
Individuals are not able to donate their medical data posthumously for the purpose of legitimate, non-
commercial and, potentially, very beneficial medical research. There appears to be no jurisdiction 
where a regulatory framework, or indeed the law, supports and enables this philanthropic cause. 
Whilst some policy options for donation under limited circumstances and for limited purposes exist, 
there are no practices through which a person can proactively donate their medical data or patient 
records for a specific research purpose, or more generally, for any non-commercial or commercial 
medical research with a worthwhile cause, in a way comparable to organ donation. This paper 
analyses whether and to what extent law and policy should enable posthumous medical data donation 
(hereinafter: PMDD). We take a comparative approach, examining the position under both US and UK 
law, providing the first comparative legal account of this practice. We focus exclusively on the post-
mortem donation of one’s patient records for medical research purposes, and not the donation all of 
their personal data, although occasionally for illustrative purposes we refer to a wider variety of data.  
Researchers in social science and humanities have discussed PMDD extensively. This practice enables 
individuals to employ their altruistic motivations and aspirations by helping them participate in 
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‘citizen’s science’ and medical research.1 Krutzinna et. al. put forward ten key persuasive arguments 
for PMDD, including solidarity, altruism, the right to science, but also economic and other social and 
ethical reasons.2 Benefits of PMDD include supporting advanced and personalised medical research, 
and providing a basis for data mining, machine learning and AI, thereby helping to generate new 
understandings of some of the most severe medical concerns facing humanity (e.g. cancer and mental 
illness).3 In the US, researchers have found that the deceased subject Integrated Data Repository 
(dsIDR) at Marshfield Clinic will contain more deceased patients than living patients by 2056.4 Their 
confirmatory assessment at IDR of Columbia University Medical Center in New York showed a similar 
trend.5 This is a significant amount of data that will have considerable value, even in the context of a 
fragmented health care system, such as that of the US. In the UK, NHS records are more centralised. 
In England, for instance, this is achieved through the Spine platform, which is also used for the data 
opt-out regime, discussed below.6 
Legal scholarship in the area is extremely sparse. One of the first papers in the field, however, was 
written by Harbinja as a part of her work towards The Code for Posthumous Medical Data Donation, 
developed by the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute.7 Harbinja’s paper focused on UK 
law and regulation, or rather, the lack of it. The paper explored how health data and medical records 
are currently protected in the UK, with a particular focus on the medical data and records of the 
deceased. She also examined other key issues around ownership and succession of personal data for 
the purpose of establishing their effects on PMDD. The paper briefly considered some overarching 
parallels with organ donation legislation to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from 
this comparable area of law. The conclusion drawn from the abovementioned analyses was that a 
bespoke regulative regime for PMDD is needed. This, ideally, would require making amendments to 
the General Data Protection Regulation to ensure harmonisation and consistency across the EU, as 
well as between general and sector-specific data protection laws and policies. Another option she 
considered was the introduction of an NHS policy that would govern PMDD, similar to the current NHS 
option that allows individuals to opt-out of their data being used for medical research.8 In another 
salient paper, Sorbie argues that consent of the deceased should not be a ‘silver bullet’ for such a 
regime and that there is room for setting up a more balanced framework. The author proposes a 
dynamic data governance framework, consisting of institutions that control data flows and can issue 
                                                             
1 Vayena E, Tasioulas J. (2015) “’We the Scientists’: a Human Right to Citizen Science’. Philosophy & 
Technology. 28: 479–485; Krutzinna J., Taddeo M., Floridi L. (2019)” Enabling Posthumous Medical Data 
Donation: A Plea for the Ethical Utilisation of Personal Health Data”. in: Krutzinna J., Floridi L. (eds) The Ethics 
of Medical Data Donation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 137. Springer, Cham 
2 Krutzinna, Taddeo and Floridi, ibid.  
3 Prainsack, B. (2014) “The Powers of Participatory Medicine”. PLoS Biology. 12(4): e1001837; Krutzinna J., 
Floridi L. (eds) The Ethics of Medical Data Donation. Philosophical Studies Series. 
4 dsIDR initially started as a research idea for a local or a central repository of the deceased’s health records in 
the USA, or its parts. The repository facilitates researchers’ access to valuable data without fulfilling all the 
conditions required for the use of the data of the living individuals, as per HIPAA. For more see:  Huser V. and 
Cimino J.J. (2013) “Don't take your EHR to heaven, donate it to science: legal and research policies for EHR post 
mortem” AMIA Jt Summits Transl Sci Proc, 95. eCollection, at: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24303243  
5 Huser, Vojtech & Miller, Aaron & K Vawdrey, David. (2014) “Evaluating the size of deceased patient EHR 
research data sets: A multi-year trend analysis” 10.13140/2.1.4229.0884. 
6 NHS Digital, Systems and services, “Spine”, at https://digital.nhs.uk/services/spine  
7 Krutzinna, Taddeo and Floridi (n 1) 
8 Harbinja E. (2019) “Posthumous Medical Data Donation: The Case for a Legal Framework” in: Krutzinna J., 




authorisation for the use of medical records in public interest (such as the Confidentiality Advisory 
Group (CAG) in England and the Public Benefit and Privacy Panel (PBPP) in Scotland; we discuss the 
role of CAG in the following section).9  
This paper builds on the abovementioned research and offers the first comparative analysis of UK and 
US legal and regulatory frameworks regarding PMDD. The paper’s purpose to not to suggest a detailed 
legal solution for PMDD, but rather key considerations and principles for legislative/policy reforms, 
which would enable the practice of PMDD. We discuss organ donation in much greater depth in this 
paper and provide a comparative outlook with the aim of drawing lessons from this practice, and 
applying them to the regulation of PMDD. Our analysis is both normative and black letter since we 
consider arguments regarding the necessity of organ and data donation, as well as the law that 
regulates these practices. In section 2, we discuss post-mortem legal protection of the deceased’s data 
and patients records in the UK and US. We examine the current law and policies in the UK and US to 
establish which regime is more suitable for PMDD and whether, if any, constituent mechanisms could 
be incorporated into a PMDD regulatory framework. Section 3 then analyses organ donation 
regulatory regimes in the UK (England primarily) and the US (at a federal level). The purpose of this 
section is to identify similarities and potential regulatory solutions that we could apply to a future 
PMDD regulatory regime. Finally, we offer suggestions for a regulatory framework for PMDD. 
 
 
2. Legal protection of the deceased’s health data and patient records in the UK and US 
 
 
Harbinja discusses the legal protection of the deceased’s’ health data in her earlier paper, but the 
analysis is limited to the EU and UK. For clarity, we briefly set out these findings here before making 
comparisons with US law and policy. We expand on her earlier analysis of certain points, particularly 
those concerning the NHS opt-out regime for using data beyond direct care purposes.  
 
 
2.1. UK law and policy  
 
The EU data protection framework does not protect the deceased’s personal data. This is made clear 
by Recital 27 of GDPR, which explicitly excludes the personal data of deceased person’s from its scope. 
The recital does, however, allow the Member States to expand their national data protection regimes 
to include such data if they wish. The UK has opted not to take this approach, with s. 3(2) DPA 2018 
defining personal data as information relating to ‘living individuals’ only. This means that health data 
and patient records of deceased persons, which would ordinarily be special category data,10 are not 
protected at the EU or UK level. Accordingly, the processing (i.e. almost any use) of the personal data 
of deceased persons does not need to comply with the data protection principles, nor does it require 
a legitimising ground.11 
 
                                                             
9 Sorbie A. (2019) “Medical Data Donation, Consent and the Public Interest After Death: A Gateway to 
Posthumous Data Use” in: Krutzinna J., Floridi L. (eds) The Ethics of Medical Data Donation. Philosophical 
Studies Series, vol 137. Springer, Cham 
10 Health-related data in the EU and the UK belong to  ‘special categories of personal data’ (article 9 General 
Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) and s. 10 and 11 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018)). 
Processing of the special categories of data is in principle prohibited by the GDPR, and only allowed on the 
basis of ten general grounds, including relevant grounds for health data, as per art. 9 2. (a), (c), (h), (i), (j) GDPR 
and schedule 2 part 6 of the DPA 2018. 
11 See: Arts 5 and 9 GDPR. 
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Nevertheless, in the UK, the lack of general data protection of the deceased’s medical data has been 
somewhat mitigated by sector-specific legislation. For example, the Access to Health Records Act 1990 
states that health records must be kept securely and that access is only permitted in limited 
circumstances.12 In England, GP health records are passed on to Primary Care Support England and 
retained for 10 years after death. This period can be extended for up to 100 years. Additionally, The 
Public Records Act 1958 stipulates that GP records will become public when forwarded to local 
authorities after the death of the patient. Most records are closed for 30 years post-mortem and those 
related to physical and mental health are closed for 100 years. Permission can be sought from the 
Public Records Office to use data of deceased persons in research if confidentiality can be 
guaranteed.13 The Department of Health advises that hospital records are kept for 8 years. 
Interestingly, however, at the policy level, there is already a regime for the use of data of the deceased. 
The NHS, for instance, has recently extended their data opt-out regime for purposes beyond direct 
care, including research, to include the data of the deceased, with an option for a pre-mortem opt-
out.14 This means that records will be used in research inter alia, unless there is a wish to the contrary 
expressed by the deceased.15 Researchers can submit requests for the use of confidential patient 
information which will be considered by the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG). Interestingly, the 
data opt-out regime does not apply where a person has given their explicit consent to other specific 
uses of their medical data.16 The NHS bases this principle on a recommendation of the Caldicott 
Review, i.e. ‘People should continue to be able to give their explicit consent separately if they wish, 
e.g. to be involved in research, as they do now. They should be able to do so regardless of whether 
they have opted out of their data being used for purposes beyond direct care. This should apply to 
patients’ decisions made both before and after the implementation of the new opt-out model’.17 
Noticeably, the NHS does not specify if this exemption applies to the deceased’s data and their pre-
mortem consent for the use of their data for specific purposes. It could be argued that, due to the 
general application of the policy to the deceased’s data,18 this would be the case. Consequently, this 
would mean that nothing in this policy prevents an individual from opting for PMDD.  
 
Common law also provides some protection for the deceased’s medical data. There is some 
suggestion, for instance, that the common law duty of confidence, which doctors owe to their 
patients, might survive the death of the patient.19 The issue is unsettled in the law, as indicated by 
Harbinja.20 For the purpose of this paper, however, we argue there is sufficient evidence to claim that 
                                                             
12 See, for instance, section 3(1)(f) of the Act, which allows for a personal representatives of the deceased, or 
individuals with claim arising out of the death of the deceased, to access the deceased’s medical records.   
13 Medical Research Council (2003) “Ethics Series: Personal Information in Medical Research” 
https://mrc.ukri.org/documents/pdf/personal-information-in-medical-research/ and Harbinja (n 8) pp. 101 – 
103.  
14 NHS (2019) “National Data Opt-out Operational Policy Guidance Document”,  4 March 2019, at: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/services/national-data-opt-out-programme/operational-policy-guidance-document  
15 Ibid, s. 6.  
16 Ibid. 
17 National Data Guardian for Health and Care (2016) “Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-Outs” June 
2016, at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535024/
data-security-review.PDF , s. 3.2.30. 
18 ‘A national data opt-out continues to be maintained and applied for an individual after they have died. Health 
and adult social care organisations are expected to continue to apply opt-outs for deceased patients and their 
opt-out will continue to be held on the Spine repository.’ NHS (n 14), s. 2. 
19 Lewis v Secretary of State for Health & Anor [2008] LS Law Med 559; Decisions by the Information tribunal 
support this stance (see Webber v IC and Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust GIA/4090/2012 and M v IC and 
Medicines and Health Products Regulatory Authority GIA/3017/2010) 
20 Harbinja (n 8), p. 201. 
5 
 
the duty of confidence does survive the death of the patient. There is, of course, a need to clarify this 
area of law and we hope that case law will develop in a way that affirms of a post-mortem duty of 
confidence. It is important to note here that the National Health Service Act 2006 allows the Secretary 
of State for Health and Social Care to make regulations to authorise or mandate the processing of 
confidential patient information (CPI) for specific medical purposes and, thus, to set aside the common 
law duty of confidence. The regulations made under this provision are the Health Service (Control of 
Patient Information) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/ 1438) (‘COPI Regulations’). They enable the disclosure 
of CPI without consent as long as the requirements of the regulations are met and the person 
responsible for the information complies with all other relevant legal obligations including those 
imposed by data protection legislation. Relevant purposes include those relating to patients referred 
for the diagnosis or treatment of cancer to be processed for the medical purposes (Regulation 2), and 
the diagnosis, control, prevention or recognition of communicable diseases and other risks to public 
health (Regulation 3). Regulation 5 provides an avenue for CPI to be processed for medical purposes 
set out in the Regulation’s Schedule, including ‘the audit, monitoring and analysing of the provision 
made by the health service for patient care and treatment’. Applications for access under Regulation 
2 or 5 are submitted to CAG who provide independent expert advice to the relevant decision-maker 
(Health Research Authority for research applications and the Secretary of State for non-research 
applications).21 A standard condition of CAG’s advice seems to be that patient objections to the use of 
this information should be respected. Notably, CAG has stated it will not be in the public interest to 
override an objection ‘in anything other than the most exceptional circumstances’.22 An implication of 
this is that, in effect, patent’s consent or its withdrawal through an opt-out regime, such as that 
described above, would maintain the duty of confidence and prevent the use of CPI for research 
purposes defined by Regulations 2 and 5. It is unclear whether this applies to deceased CPI. The 
significance of consent and opt-out in this process demonstrates the need for PMDD, and for a clear 
mechanism through which consent can be obtained regarding CPI being used for research purposes.  
2.2. US law and policy  
US law generally does not protect personal data of the deceased.23 At the federal level, researchers 
are encouraged to share data by the America COMPETES Act.24 This law relates to data already used 
by researchers, rather than enabling access to the medical records of deceased individuals that have 
not previously been the subject of research. Ethical approval by an institutional review board (IRB) is 
required for every research activity intended for publication. For general, non-research uses of 
electronic health record (EHR) data, a change in January 2013 to the HIPAA privacy rule (aka ‘the 
omnibus rule’) shortened the protection of personal health information (PHI) from an indefinite period 
of time to a period of 50 years from the patient’s death. This is considered a period of protection that 
extends over two generations, similar to that used in the context of copyright.25 The HIPAA permits 
state law to extend this provision, meaning states are not pre-empted by the federal requirements. 
For example, the state of Hawaii still mandates indefinite protection.26 Given what we have said about 
                                                             
21 Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/ 1438), Regulation 5. 
22 NHS Health Research Authority, (2018) “National data opt-out” 24 May 2018, at: 
https://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-us/news-updates/national-data-opt-out/  
23 Edwards, L. and Harbinja, E. (2013) “Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: Reconsidering the Privacy Interests of 
the Deceased in a Digital World” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal. 32(1): 83-129; Harbinja, E. (2017). 
“Post-mortem privacy 2.0: theory, law, and technology” International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 
31(1): 26-42. doi:10.1080/13600869.2017.1275116 
24 America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science 
Act, 20 USC 9801 
25 Kels, C. G. et al. (2013) “Medical Privacy After Death: Implications of New Modifications to the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule” Mayo Clinic Proceedings, Volume 88, Issue 10, 1051 
– 1055, p. 1051.  
26 Haw. Rev. Stat. section 323C-43 
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the protection of health records and patient data in the UK, US protection generally seems to last for 
a longer period of time.  
The HIPAA, however, allows for the disclosure of PHI of decedents without IRB or privacy board 
approval.27 Such disclosures are dependent on three conditions: (1) use is sought solely for research 
on the PHI of decedents; (2) the researcher can provide, on request, documentation of the death for 
subjects used in the study; and (3) the PHI is necessary for the research - the ‘decedent research 
clause’. Interestingly, some institutions interpret this rule as requiring researchers to obtain 
authorisation from next of kin, or a waiver of authorization from an IRB or Privacy Board, in order to 
access the PHI of decedents.28 This is a very restrictive interpretation of the HIPAA provision. However, 
perhaps understandably, research ethics processes often include additional non-legal requirements 
to mitigate ethical risks that are not of a legal nature.29 The likely reason for this is the effect research 
might have on the next of kin and relatives of the deceased, for instance, the revealing of hereditary 
diseases.  
In summary, US law protects the deceased’s patient records for at least 50 years post-mortem. 
Researchers are allowed to access such data for research purposes if they fulfil the three requirements 
set out above. However, as ethical processes require additional authorisations this is not a common 
occurrence. After 50 years PHI can generally be freely used in research unless a state has a provision 
to the contrary (see the example of Hawaii). Difficulties may arise, however, in relation to the 
availability of PHI, and how such data are stored, maintained and deleted. Given the fragmented 
nature of the US health care and associated systems, this could constitute a barrier to access to such 
data for researchers after legal protection has expired, especially in the lack of repositories such as 
the dsIDR mentioned in section 1.  
In terms of doctor and patient confidentiality, state case law sets out different rules as to whether and 
to what extent the duty survives the patient’s death.30 For example, New Jersey courts have hinted 
that physicians might have to balance their duty to warn relatives at risk of hereditary diseases with 
their duty of patient confidentiality.31 Statutes also offer varied legislative approaches. Some state 
laws uphold the confidentiality of genetic information, and other states limit confidentiality with 
certain exceptions.32 Oregon legislation, for instance, permits the disclosure of genetic data when it is 
pertinent to medical diagnoses of relatives of the deceased.33 The American Medical Association Code 
of Ethics clearly states that doctors have the obligation to protect patient information, including 
information obtained post mortem.34 There are exceptions to this rule, including, inter alia, a patient’s 
explicit consent or directive. In spite of disparate state law, therefore, confidentiality does generally 
seem to extend beyond the patient’s death. Similar to the UK, this has been achieved through policies, 
occasionally statutes, and, to a lesser extent, by case law.   
 
                                                             
27 HIPAA - protected health information (PHI) 45 CFR 164.512(i)(1)(iii) 
28 Ness R. (2007) “Influence on the HIPAA Privacy Rule on health research” JAMA, 298(18): 2164–2170. 
29 Research ethics codes and procedures thus include values that may underpin the law, but are not necessarily 
legal categories, e.g. honesty, objectivity, openness, competence etc.  
30 Berg, Jessica Wilen, (2001) "Grave Secrets: Ethical and Legal Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality” Faculty 
Publications. 572. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/572 
31 Safer v Estate of Pack, 677 A2d 1188 (NJ Supp 1996). 
32 King M. (2000) “Physician duty to warn a patient’s offspring of hereditary genetic defects: balancing the 
patient’s right to confidentiality against the family member’s right to know—can or should Tarasoff apply?” 
Quinnipiac Health Law J.; 4(1):1-38. 
33 Disclosure of genetic information; exceptions. Or Rev Stat section 192.539 (2011). 




2.3. Comparison  
A comparison of UK and US regimes reveals that neither requires consent for the processing of the 
deceased’s health data. At a sector-specific level, however, the American system seems clearer and 
more permissive in respect of using data for medical research, with some discrepancies at the state 
level. The UK Access to Health Records Act 1990, for instance, makes no provisions for researchers to 
access patient records. The NHS Act 2006, Regulations of the Secretary of State for Health, and NHS 
policy allow for the granting of access in limited circumstances, in the absence of any patient wish to 
the contrary. The US is more permissive at the legislative level, but less so at the policy level, since 
ethical procedures require consent from the next of kin, or waiver of this authorisation by an 
appropriate institution. The upshot of this, therefore, is that policy and legislative interventions in 
both countries would be necessary if a PMDD regulatory regime was to be introduced, and for its 
framework to be coherently set out. Even in the more permissive environment of the US, there is no 
option for a person to actively opt-in to PMDD. Researchers can access such data under the conditions 
considered above, but this has nothing to do with the deceased’s wishes or consent. UK policy, on the 
other hand, mentions consent but does not establish a mechanism through which it can be recorded 
and executed. The NHS data opt-out policy in the UK is the closest thing to what could be considered 
a form of PMDD. However, this is an opt-out regime and is not specific enough in terms of purpose 
and benefits so to qualify as PMDD. In addition, the fact that it can be overridden by a specific consent 
prevents it from being what we consider to be true PMDD. 
 
 
3. Organ donation and data protection: closely aligned rationales   
Having discussed the potentially applicable law and policy to PMDD, and argued that fresh regulatory 
interventions are required, we now consider the law of organ donation. In this section and the next, 
we outline and compare UK and US regimes, and identify some important challenges inherent in the 
construction of any PMDD regulatory framework.  
 
The purpose of organ donation legislation is to regulate the post-mortem handling of bodily material. 
The majority of developed nations worldwide have bespoke organ donation laws and, though 
approaches differ, most examples of such legislative frameworks have two core objectives. The first: 
to establish and protect individual autonomy and posthumous bodily integrity. The second: to 
facilitate important and innovative uses of bodily material, notably for medical research or 
transplantation. A primary example of such a piece of legislation is the UK Human Tissue Act 2004,35 
passed following scandals at the Bristol Royal Infirmary and Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital in 
1999-2000, the details of which were revealed by the Kennedy and Redfern Inquiries.36 The Act, as 
considered in more detail below, contains a number of provisions that enshrine the right of individuals 
to control what happens to their bodily material post-death. Against this background, organ donation 
laws represent a useful starting point for discussions regarding the construction of a regulatory 
framework for PMDD.37 The most significant indicator of this is the fact that organ donation laws, such 
as the HTA, and data protection laws, such as the GDPR and DPA 2018, are rooted in the similar 
theoretical ground, and share an analogous rationale as well as various conceptual and practical 
                                                             
35 [hereinafter HTA 2004] 
36 For an overview of the details of these scandals, see: Sheach Leith, V. (2007) “Consent and nothing but 
consent? The organ retention scandal”, Sociology of Health & Illness. See also: Burton, J. and Underwood, J. 
(2003) “Necropsy practice after the “organ retention scandal”: requests, performance, and tissue retention”, 
Journal of Clinical Pathology. 
37 [hereinafter PMDD] 
8 
 
similarities.38 If we look at the key concepts central to both organ donation laws and data protection 
laws, and how they are treated, this is immediately apparent.  
As alluded to above, organ donation laws are ordinarily concerned with regulating the handling of 
“bodily material”, or similar, to prevent such material being used for unethical or inappropriate 
purposes. Data protection law, on the other hand, is concerned with regulating the processing (i.e. 
almost any use) of personal data, and ensuring that any processing complies with the data protection 
principles.39 Immediately we see a similarity. Both types of legislation identify a central concept 
around which their entire operation is based and subject the treatment, handling, and use of that 
concept to various rules. If an action does not pertain to the said concept the substantive rules of the 
legislation will not be engaged. Any action not involving “bodily material”, for instance, will generally 
fall outside the scope of organ donation laws. Likewise, the processing of any non-personal (e.g. 
anonymous) data will fall outside the scope of data protection law.40 This is an initially superficial 
comparison. If we look more closely at these two concepts, however, it is evident that this similarity 
goes much deeper. Specifically, the notions of bodily material and personal data are themselves 
conceptually alike, and the need to regulate their usage and/or handling is frequently justified by way 
of reference to a comparable rationale.  
Bodily material and the need to control its handling by legal means is most frequently justified by way 
of reference to the identity of the individual to whom it relates. To this end, organ donation laws 
identify bodily material as an innate aspect of a person’s personhood and express its protection in the 
form of legal values. The crux of this position is that legal rules of this sort are critical to the protection 
of autonomy, bodily integrity, and human dignity.41 Data protection law operates on a similar basis. 
The recitals of the GDPR, for instance, specify how the processing of personal data must be consistent 
with values and notions intrinsically linked to individual personhood and dignity, such as the right to 
a private and family life.42 The implication of this is that personal data themselves comprise of a 
fundamental aspect of an individual’s personhood. This position has been endorsed in the academic 
and scholarly literature, with some observers opining that personal data, like bodily material, are an 
extension of the self, and must be treated with the same respect as the physical person to whom they 
relate.43 Weight has been added to such assertions by empirical research that has demonstrated how 
the analysis of certain types of personal data can be deeply revealing of aspects of an individual’s 
identity.44 The upshot of this, therefore, is that both organ donation laws and data protection law are 
                                                             
38 It should perhaps be noted, however, that whilst data protection rules in the USA do not formally recognise 
proprietary interests in personal data, but academic calls for the introduction of such are widely thought to 
originate from the US. See e.g. Westin, A.F. (1967) Privacy and freedom, New York. Atheneum; Laudon, K.C. 
(1996) “Markets and privacy” 39 (9) Communications of the ACM 92-104, at 96; Schwartz, P.M. (2003)  
“Property, privacy, and personal data” 117 Harvard Law Review 2056-2128; Mell, P. (1996) “Seeking Shade in a 
Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness” 11 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 1-79. 
39 See: Article 5 GDPR.  
40 See: Recital 26 GDPR.   
41 Evans, R., & E. Ferguson. 2014. Defining and measuring blood donor altruism: a theoretical approach from 
biology, economics and psychology. Vox sanguinis. 106(2): 118-126 and Price, D. 2000. Legal and Ethical 
Aspects of Organ Transplantation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
42 Recital 4 GDPR. 
43 See, for instance: Stevenson, S. quoted in Ethical Technology Use, Policy and Reactions in Educational 
Settings, ed. by Beycioglu, K. (2012) Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Pg.87. See also: Microsoft (last accessed 
December 2017) “Personal Control of Data”, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/video/personal-
control-of-data/ 
44 For instance, a 2013 study by the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
demonstrated that a wide variety of an individual’s personal attributes, ranging from their sexual orientation 
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prima facie concerned with providing individuals with protection in respect of a commodity, or 
concept, which is directly and inextricably linked to their personhood. In other words, both aim to 
protect something that is “personal” to the individual (whether bodily material or data), and justify 
the pursuit of this aim by way of reference to unacceptable threats to personhood and human dignity 
that would manifest in the absence of regulatory intervention.45 As explored below, both areas of law 
seek to achieve this objective by providing individuals with means through which they can exercise 
control. 
A further similarity regarding the legal treatment of bodily material and personal data is that, whilst 
their respective legislative regimes outline rules and rights that allow individuals to exercise control 
over a commodity intrinsically linked to their personhood, neither couch such provisions in the 
language pertaining to the protection of proprietary interests. Ordinarily, negative rights pertaining to 
restricting the access to, or use of, commodities are recognised as property rights, and formally 
denoted as such.46 This, however, is generally not the case for rules of this type found in legislation 
pertaining to organ donation and data protection. Using the HTA 2004 as an example once again, some 
have argued that its rules regarding negative control over bodily material only make sense if we accept 
individuals have proprietary interests in their body parts,47 but this is surely incorrect. As considered 
below, and convincingly argued elsewhere, the rights contained within the HTA protect autonomy and 
dignity-related interests and do not formally recognise the existence of property rights in the human 
body.48 Similar observations can be made in respect of data protection law’s treatment of personal 
data. Though the desirability and existence of property rights in personal data is a topic that remains 
hotly contested, the orthodox view is that despite some aspects of data protection law evincing 
“property-like” features, individuals do not formally enjoy property rights in their personal data.49 The 
rights enshrined in legislation pertaining to organ donation and data protection, therefore, both prima 
                                                             
to intelligence, can be automatically inferred from personal data taken from social networking sites such as 
Facebook. Kosinski, M. Stillwell, D. and Graepel, T. (2013) “Private traits and attributes are predictable from 
digital records of human behaviour”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America. pg.4. 
45 On this issue, see: Pearce, H. (2018) “Could the doctrine of moral rights be used as a basis for understanding 
the notion of control within data protection law?”, Information and Communications Technology Law 27(2), 
pp.133-165; Harbinja (n 23); Floridi, L. (2016). “On human dignity as a foundation for the right to privacy” 
Philosophy and Technology. doi: 10.1007/s13347-016-022. 
46 See: L Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights. in R Pennock and J Chapman (eds), Nomos XXII: Property 
(New York University Press 1980) 187-220; P Eleftheriadis, 'The Analysis of Property Rights' [1996] 16(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 31-54; J Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press 1997) 71; S 
Balganesh, 'Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions' [2008] 
31(2) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 593; T Merrill, 'Property and the Right to Exclude' [1998] 77(4) 
Nebraska Law Review 730 
47 See, for example: Price, D. (2009) Human Tissue in Transplantation and Research: A Model Legal and Ethical 
Donation Framework, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Pattinson, S. (2011) “Directed donation and 
ownership of human organs”, Legal Studies. See also: Nwabueze, R. (2008) “Donated organs, property rights, 
and the remedial quagmire”, Medical Law Review. 
48 Herring, J. and Chau, P.-L. (2007) “My body, your body, our bodies”, Medical Law Review; Herring, J. (2016) 
Medical Law and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also of note is the way in which US courts have 
traditionally recognised quasi-property rights, if not full property rights, in dead bodies and corpses. On this 
issue, see: Zee, J. (2008) “The Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act: Bringing California Donation up to 
Contemporary Medical, Legal and Bioethical Practices”, McGeorge Law Review.  
49 See: Pearce, H. (2018) “Personality, property and other provocations: exploring the conceptual muddle of 
data protection rights under EU law”, European Data Protection Law Review 4(2); E Harbinja, 'Does the EU 
Data Protection Regime Protect Post-Mortem Privacy and What Could be the Potential Alternatives?' [2013] 
10(1) SCRIPTed 26; Harbinja (n 23); Lynskey, O. (2014) “Deconstructing data protection: the ‘added-value’ of a 
right to data protection in the EU legal order”, International Comparative Law Quarterly 63(3). 
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facie treat personhood-related commodities as aspects of an individual’s personality rather than 
property.  
Closely related to the second similarity is the way the rights granted by organ donation and data 
protection rules regarding individual control are not absolute. Both types of legislation recognise the 
value of bodily material and personal data as commodities and the need for wider communal interests 
to triumph over those of the individual in some situations. Article 17 of the GDPR, for instance, confers 
on individuals the controversial “right to be forgotten”, which allows them to acquire erasure of their 
personal data from data controllers. This right, however, is not absolute and attempts to exercise it 
may not always prevail against other competing interests.50 Similar observations can be made in 
respect of rules often found in organ donation legislation. As is considered in more detail below, for 
instance, the HTA’s rules relating to individual control of bodily material will not apply in a range of 
exceptional situations. The upshot of this is that whilst both areas of law attempt to give individuals 
sovereignty in respect of a commodity central to their personhood, this sovereignty is far from 
absolute. Both areas of law, therefore, are premised on the belief that whilst individuals should enjoy 
autonomy in respect of personhood-related commodities, individual interests must occasionally cede 
to those of the community.  
4. Organ donation legislation in practice 
For the reasons stated above, organ donation legislation represents a logical and sensible starting 
point for discussions regarding how to construct a legal framework for PMDD. The next step in our 
analysis is to examine precisely how organ donation laws operate in practice, and whether any lessons 
can be derived from their experiences. To do this we use two prominent legislative regimes as case 
studies: the UK Human Tissue Act 2004, referred to above, and the US Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
2006. 
4.1. The UK Human Tissue Act 2004 
Section 1 of the HTA specifies it will be lawful to remove, store, or use “human material”51 from 
deceased and living persons provided “necessary consent” has been obtained, and the removal, 
                                                             
50 This is made explicitly clear by Art.6(1)(g) GDPR where it is stated specified that the processing of personal 
data will be lawful when it is “necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller 
or a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject”. Art.6(1)(g), therefore, implies that a balancing exercise which weighs the 
legitimate interests of the data controller against the rights of data subjects if personal data processing 
activities are to be legitimised on the basis of the data controller’s legitimate interests. This is an issue that has 
been considered by both the Article 29 Working Party and, more recently, the CJEU. See: Article 29 Working 
Party (2014) Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of 
Directive 95/46/EC, WP 217 and Case C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas 
pārvalde v Rīgas pašvaldības SIA ‘Rīgas satiksme’, EU:C:2017:336. More generally, EU data protection law also 
allows for the rights and interests of individual data subjects to be balanced against other competing interests, 
such as national security imperatives. On this issue, see: A Dimitrova and M Brkan, 'Balancing National Security 
and Data Protection: The Role of EU and US Policy Makers after the NSA Affair' [2017] 54(3) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 636 
51 “Human material” is defined by section 53 HTA as including the tissue, cells and organs of human beings, but 
excluding hair, nails, and gametes and embryos stored outside of the body.  
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storage, or use is done for a purpose listed in schedule 1 of the Act. Consent, however, is not defined 
by the Act itself, and is instead explained by the Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice on Consent:52  
“For consent to be valid it must be given voluntarily, by an appropriately informed person who 
has the capacity to agree to the activity in question.”53 
It is further specified that consents must be expressed positively (i.e. “opt-in”), and that a failure to 
object, or acquiescence, will not be sufficient.54 Moreover, consents must be specific, relate to a 
particular purpose, and can be withdrawn at any time.55 If consent is not obtained, the removal, 
storage, or use of bodily material will, as a general matter, be a criminal offence.56 This rule applies 
regardless of whether the person from whom material is extracted is alive or deceased. In other words, 
the removal of material from a corpse will require consent if it is to be lawful.  
Interestingly, however, the HTA allows for consent to be given by an individual other than whom from 
which the human material is to be extracted. Though section 3 specifies that in circumstances 
involving living adults consent must be obtained from the adult himself or herself, assuming they have 
the capacity to give consent,57 different rules apply in situations involving deceased persons.  
According to the HTA, consent to extract material from a deceased individual can be obtained one of 
three ways. First, the deceased themselves can give consent via a will or other testamentary 
disposition. Second, assuming the deceased did not declare their intentions prior to death, an 
appointed representative, appointed by the deceased prior to death, can give consent on the 
deceased’s behalf. Third, if no representative has been appointed, the person in the closest “qualifying 
relationship” can give consent.58 
From this overview we the value and significance the HTA places upon consent is clear. Its utilisation 
in the manner outlined above (i.e. a de facto presumption that no extraction of bodily material is 
allowed unless consent is present) shows precisely how the HTA gives the individual considerable 
sovereignty in respect of their bodily material and its usage, even post-death. Whilst this is the default 
position, however, there are numerous exceptions. For example, under section 7 of the Act, when 
consent has not been given, the Human Tissue Authority has the power to deem (i.e. infer) its 
existence. This power can be used when it is impossible to trace the individual from whom material 
originates, or in situations where reasonable attempts have been made to obtain consent but no 
response has been received. High Court Orders can also be used to mandate the removal of human 
material from the body of a person, living or dead, without consent, if this is deemed to be in the 
public interest.59 This is a highly controversial provision, and it is perhaps for this reason that, as noted 
                                                             
52 The Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice on Consent is a non-binding document that provides practical 
guidance to professionals carrying out activities within the scope of the Human Tissue Act. [hereinafter the 
Code] 
53 Ibid., paragraph 40. 
54 Ibid., paragraph 30. It is important to note, however, that from spring 2020 the current “opt-in” system of 
consent will be replaced by a new “opt-out” system. 
55 Broad consents, for example for “research purposes”, are deemed specific enough to be permissible. The 
Code, paragraphs 29, 48 and 51 
56 Section 5(1) HTA 2004.  
57 If a living adult lacks capacity to consent, consent can be deemed in some situations under the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006. 
58 As per section 27(4) HTA 2004, possible qualifying relations are ranked in the following order: (a) spouse or 
partner; (b) parent or child; (c) brother or sister; (d) grandparent or grandchild; (e) child of brother or sister; (f) 
stepfather or stepmother; (g) half-brother or half-sister; (f) friend of long standing. 
59 See: Section 7(4) HTA 2004. 
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elsewhere, the UK Government has stated that it should only be utilised in extraordinary cases.60 
Research activities ethically approved in line with regulations issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health,61 material removed in the course of treatment,62 material imported from other jurisdictions,63 
and material obtained prior to the enactment of the HTA,64 are all also exempt from the rules relating 
to individual consent. 
In addition to specifying that removing, storing of using bodily material without consent is a criminal 
offence, the HTA also outlines a range of other associated offences. Falsely representing consent (e.g. 
claiming consent has been given when it has not),65 using or storing donated material for an improper 
purpose,66 and buying or selling bodily material,67 are all behaviours that will result in prosecution.  
4.2. The US Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 2006 
The primary piece of legislation governing organ donation in the USA is the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act 2006.68 The UAGA is a model act drafted by the Uniform Law Commission that must be passed into 
law by individual states to become active.69 In apparent recognition of the need for a uniform 
approach to organ donation regulation, the UAGA has been enacted in every US state. Like the UK 
HTA, the UAGA establishes an opt-in system for organ donation. However, the legal principle central 
to the UAGA is gift law, as opposed to “consent” which, as noted above, plays a central role in the 
HTA.70 Under the UAGA an (adult) individual can make an “anatomical gift” prior to their death,71 or 
such a gift can be authorised by an agent,72 a parent,73 or a guardian74 at the time of the individual’s 
death. Section 2(3) of the Act defines an “anatomical gift” as: 
“…donation of all or part of a human body to take effect after the donor’s death for the purpose 
of transplantation, therapy, research, or education.” 
A person can make a gift be made by authorising a statement indicating their desire to do so, by 
making a will expressing a desire to make a gift, or by expressing an intention to do so in any form of 
communication to at least two adult people, one of whom is a “disinterested witness.”75 Anatomical 
                                                             
60 Price, D. (2005) “The Human Tissue Act 2004”, Modern Law Review.  
61 Sections 1(7)-(9) HTA 2004. These provisions bear some similarity to the Regulations considered above 
concerning access to medical data for research purposes. 
62 Section 42 HTA 2004. 
63 Special provisions specify, however, that bodily material that is exported and then imported will fall outside 
the scope of this exemption.  
64 Section 9(4) HTA 2004. 
65 Section 5(2) HTA 2004. 
66 Section 8(4) HTA 2004. 
67 Section 32 HTA 2004. 
68 [hereinafter UAGA] 
69 The Uniform Law Commission is a body of law and policy experts appointed by the governors of each state 
to identify areas that would benefit from uniformity nationwide, but which cannot be federally regulated 
because they fall under the reserved powers of the state. Organ donation is one such area.  
70 On the significance of this nuance, see: Glazier, A. (2018) “Organ Donation and the Principles of Gift Law”, 
Clinical Journal of American Society of Nephrology 13(8), pp.1283-1284. 
71 Section 4(1) UAGA 
72 Section 4(2) UAGA 
73 Section 4(3) UAGA 
74 Section 4(4) UAGA 
75 Section 5 UAGA. “Disinterested witness” is defined by section 2(5) of the Act as a person other than the 
spouse, child, parent, sibling, grandchild, grandparent, or guardian of the donor.  
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gifts can be revoked via a record signed either by the donor themselves or their surrogate, or another 
person acting on their behalf.76  
Section 9 of the Act specifies that any member of the classes of persons listed below may authorise 
an anatomical gift from the body of a deceased person, for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, 
research or education. These are listed by the Act in order of priority (i.e. the wishes of a person in a 
lower-ranked class cannot triumph over those of a person in a higher class): 
- An agent of the deceased; 
- The spouse of the deceased; 
- Adult children of the deceased; 
- Parents of the deceased; 
- Adult siblings of the deceased; 
- Adult grandchildren of the deceased; 
- Grandparents of the deceased; 
- An adult person who has exhibited special care for the deceased; 
- A person acting as guardian for the deceased at the time of death; 
- Any other person having the authority to dispose of the deceased’s body (e.g. a coroner or 
medical professional). 
Another point of interest is the way in which the UAGA places a range of positive statutory duties on 
certain third parties, in addition to the rules relating to donors themselves and people making 
decisions on their behalf. Police officers, firefighters, and paramedics, for instance, must, when 
encountering a deceased person, or a person who is close to death, make a reasonable search for a 
document outlining the person’s intentions regarding whether to make a gift.77 If this is located, and 
the person in question is sent to hospital, the document must also be sent. Breach of this duty is not 
a criminal offence but may be subject to administrative sanctions and civil penalties. Hospitals, and 
their staff are placed under a similar duty to refer individuals who are close to death to an organ 
procurement organisation, which will then search for the records of the individual to determine 
whether they are a registered donor.78 
Like the HTA, the UAGA also outlines some specific criminal offences that may be committed in the 
context of bodily material and the handling thereof. Specifically, any person who knowingly sells or 
purchases a human body, or any part of a body, will incur criminal liability for doing so.79 Falsifying, 
forging, concealing, defacing or obliterating a document authorising or revoking a gift will also be a 
crime.80  
 
5. Lessons to be learned?  
The previous section revealed numerous consistent themes between UK and US organ donation 
regimes. The purpose of this section is to consider the significance of some of these themes and 
evaluate their possible salience in the context of designing a regulatory framework for PMDD.   
 
                                                             
76 Section 6 UAGA. 
77 Section 12 UAGA. 
78 Section 14 UAGA 
79 Section 16 UAGA 
80 Section 17 UAGA 
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5.1. The role of the individual 
Perhaps the most significant question to be asked regarding the construction of a bespoke regulatory 
framework for PMDD relates to the role of the individual and the extent to which their consent, 
authorisation, or preferences more generally, should play a role. As outlined above, the default 
position under both the HTA and UAGA is that the removal of bodily material without the consent or 
authorisation of the relevant individual, or appropriate proxy, will be unlawful. To this end, the 
individual is afforded a position of considerable influence. Should this also be the default position 
regarding posthumous donations of medical data? Should the consent or authorisation (either opt-in 
or opt-out) of the individual ordinarily be required for medical data to be donated and stored 
posthumously? The obvious answer to these questions is perhaps yes. Basing a PMDD regulatory 
framework around the ideals of individual autonomy and control, for example, would ensure its 
alignment with the growing EU policy rhetoric associated with affording individuals greater control 
over their personal data.81  
However, this would not be without controversy. As noted elsewhere, the way in which organ 
donation laws place such great emphasis on the wishes of individuals, even post-death, is a persistent 
source of criticism. Various observers have argued, for instance, that such an approach unjustly 
prioritises the wishes of the deceased person over the needs of the living.82 Bodily material, for 
example, may be extremely valuable in the context of communal or societal purposes, most obviously 
in the context of organ donation. To such observers, for the law to allow such purposes to be defeated 
by the wishes of a person who is no longer alive, and thus has no need for their bodily material, is 
completely unacceptable. Their view, therefore, is very much that the law should not require consent 
or authorisation in order for the bodily material of deceased persons to be extracted and used.83  
The main counter arguments to this position are built around the idea that if the law allows individuals 
to make testamentary dispositions in respect of their real and personal property, they should also be 
allowed to make dispositions regarding their bodies. The ability to make testamentary dispositions 
regarding real or personal property is often justified by way of reference to a personal connection an 
individual has with their material possessions. Bodily material, on the other hand, is by its very nature 
more intrinsically linked to an individual’s personhood than material possessions. Ergo, it would be 
illogical for the law, because of the existence of a personal nexus, to allow posthumous control over 
the former but not the latter. 84 In a similar vein, others have argued that ignoring a person’s wishes 
regarding what happens to their body post-death can cause them harm whilst they are still alive, 
thereby necessitating a regulatory approach conducive to individual control and autonomy.85 
It is not difficult to see how such debates could come to be replicated in the context of the construction 
of a PMDD regulatory framework. Personal data, like bodily material, as outlined above, are 
intrinsically linked to an individual’s personhood, but the processing of such data for research 
purposes may also be of huge value to the community. If an individual were to refuse for their data to 
be donated to a particular recipient, or for a particular purpose, questions in the “why should the 
                                                             
81 On this issue, see: Lazaro, C. and Le Metayer, D. (2015) “The control over personal data: True remedy or fairy 
tale?”, SCRIPTed 12(1), pg.6. 
82 See, particularly: Harris, J. (2002) “Law and regulation of retained organs: the ethical issues”, Legal Studies; 
Harris, J. (2003) “Organ procurement: dead interests, living needs”, BMJ. Bird, S. and Harris, J. (2010) “Time to 
move tp presumed consent for organ donation”, BMJ. 
83 Ibid 
84 See, particularly: Brazier, M. (2002) “”Retained organs: ethics and humanity”, Legal Studies; Brazier, M. 




wishes of the dead be capable of trumping the interests of those still living?” vein could quite 
conceivably arise. Despite such debates, it is surely likely that individual autonomy would play a focal 
role in a PMDD regulatory framework. Any divergent approach would immediately be at odds with 
the general thrust of data protection law, which, as alluded to above, has become increasingly geared 
towards establishing individual control of personal data. Whilst the consent or authorisation of the 
individual would surely play a focal role, however, a balance between individual and communitarian 
interests would clearly need to be struck. Precisely where, and how, that balance would be struck, 
however, would likely be contested. It is not immediately obvious, for instance, that the same reasons 
frequently invoked as a justification for affording individuals control and autonomy over their personal 
data in life would be equally applicable to situations relating to posthumous control, perhaps 
particularly given the abovementioned societal benefits the processing of such data may have.86  
5.2. Scope 
A second salient question that stems from the first (considered above) is that assuming the consent 
or authorisation of a relevant individual would generally be required for data to be donated under a 
PMDD regulatory framework, what should the scope of that framework be? Should, for instance, 
consent or authorisation be required for the donation or acquisition of all of an individual’s medical 
data? Or, should such requirements only be imposed on data of particular character or sensitivity? To 
place these questions in context, it is worth noting that in relation to the HTA, various observers have 
criticised the scope of its definition of “bodily material”.  It has been suggested, for instance, that the 
breadth of such terms can impede or prevent the donation of material that would be significant for 
communal purposes (e.g. medical research), but would be of no significance to the individual from 
which they would be extracted.87 For instance, the HTA’s definition of bodily material is broad enough 
to encompass a tiny amount of skin cells, which arguably would be of concern to nobody. This raises 
questions regarding whether it makes sense for consent to be required for the extraction of such 
material.  
Similar observations can be made in respect of precisely which medical data should fall within the 
scope of a PMDD regulatory framework. Whilst some medical data might be of significant concern to 
individuals and would warrant inclusion, it is not immediately obvious that the same could be said of 
all medical data. Research has established, for instance, that individuals place much greater 
importance on the security and integrity of certain types of personal data than others.88 For example, 
                                                             
86 For the counter argument to this position, see: Harbinja (n 23) 
87 See, for instance: Skene, L. (2002) “Ownership of human tissue and the law”, Nat Rev Genet; Laurie, G. and 
Mason, K. (2001) “Consent or Property: Dealing with the Body and its Parts in the Shadow of Bristol and Alder 
Hey”, Modern Law Review.  
88 See, for example: The Wellcome Trust (2013) “Summary Report of Qualitative Research Into Public Attitudes 
to Personal Data and Linking Personal Data”, available at: 
https://mesh.tghn.org/site_media/media/articles/Qualitative_Research_into_Public_Attitudes_to_Personal_D
ata_and_Linking_Persona_FLr04DM.pdf; Ipsos MORI (2014) “Privacy and personal data”, available at: 
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/migrations/en-uk/files/Assets/Docs/Polls/jrrt-privacy-topline-nhs-
2014.pdf; ICO (2014) “Annual Track 2014”, available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-
ico/documents/1043485/annual-track-september-2014-individuals.pdf; Eurobarometer (2015) “Data 
Protection”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf; 
ICO (2015) “Data protection rights: What the public want and what the public want from Data Protection 
Authorities”, available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1431717/data-protection-rights-
what-the-public-want-and-what-the-public-want-from-data-protection-authorities.pdf; DMA (2015) “Data 
privacy: what the consumer really thinks”, available at: https://dma.org.uk/uploads/ckeditor/Data-privacy-
2015-what-consumers-really-thinks_final.pdf; ODI (2018) “ODI/YouGov Poll Results – Attitudes towards data 
sharing”, available at: https://theodi.org/blog/odi-survey-reveals-british-consumer-attitudes-to-sharing-
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raw personal data relating to an individual’s health status are widely thought to be of greater concern 
than metadata relating to email communications, including those with a doctor or hospital, yet both 
data types are “personal” for the purposes of data protection law.89 Whether there would be a need 
or justification for requiring authorisation or consent to be obtained prior to the donation or 
acquisition of all types of medical data is, therefore, an important question. Precisely how such a 
framework would approach situations involving data that had nominally been anonymised, and 
situations in which the storage of medical records is fragmented, are other closely related issues that 
would also need to be considered in detail.90  
5.3. Exceptions 
Though the central notion of both organ donation regulatory frameworks considered above is that 
either consent or authorisation must be obtained before the extraction of bodily material is permitted, 
this is clearly not an absolute principle. The HTA in particular outlines a number of exceptional 
circumstances where bodily material can be extracted posthumously without consent. Notably, for 
example, as outlined above, in the absence of consent being given the HTA allows for consent to be 
inferred by the Human Tissue Authority, and for the High Court to order extraction. Assuming a 
regulatory framework for PMDD was built around the notion of individual autonomy, as outlined 
above, should it too contain a list of exceptions to this central principle, and, if so, what should the 
exceptions be?  
Logically, the answer is yes. As alluded to above, though data protection law aims to affirm an 
individual’s sovereignty over their personal data, this sovereignty is far from absolute. The fact that 
the consent of the individual is only one of the grounds listed in the GDPR through which the 
processing of personal data can be legitimised clearly shows this.91 Similarly, the GDPR also provides 
that certain data processing activities in which there is a communal interest will not have to comply 
with the data protection principles and other substantive data protection rules. Data processing 
undertaken for national security purposes, for instance, is explicitly stated to fall outside the scope of 
the GDPR.92 So to correlate with the main tenets and general thrust of the data protection law it would 
make sense for a PMDD regulatory framework to operate on a similar basis, providing for some 
situations in which the consent or authorisation of the individual would not be required for donation, 
and some activities that fall outside its scope. For example, consent or authorisation not being 
required for posthumous data handling in the context of criminal investigations, or possibly in the 
context of journalistic activities. 
Whilst this approach would be prima facie sensible, however, the experience of the organ donation 
regulatory regimes considered above suggest it would not necessarily be free from controversy. For 
example, as noted above, the main goal of the HTA and other comparable legislation is to enhance 
                                                             
personal-data-online. See also: Addae, J. (2017) et al. “Measuring attitude towards personal data for adaptive 
cybersecurity”, Information & Computer Security, available at: 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/ICS-11-2016-0085  
89 Ibid 
90 On the data-protection related difficulties that may arise in conjunction with efforts to anonymise personal 
data, see: Rocher, L. Hendrickx, J. and de Montjoye, Y. (2019) “Estimating the success of re-identifications in 
incomplete datasets using generative models”, Nature Communications. See also: Pearce, H. and Stalla-
Bourdillon, S. (2019) “Rethinking the “release and forget” ethos of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: Why 
developments in the field of anonymisation necessitate the development of a new approach to disclosing 
data”, European Journal of Law and Technology 10(1).   
91 Article 6 GDPR. 
92 Recital 16 GDPR. 
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individual autonomy and posthumous-control of bodily material. The construction of a bespoke 
regulatory regime for PMDD would likely aspire to do the same in respect of individuals’ personal data. 
However, as remarked in the literature, the existence of a long list of exceptions contained within the 
HTA arguably undermines this objective.93 Legal rules that aim to affirm autonomy will inevitably have 
limited value, for instance, if they are subject to a range of exceptions so extensive it makes it 
impossible for them to gain traction. Others have suggested that it is not clear what the Act is trying 
to achieve, and that it is a piece of legislation in conflict with itself. By attempting to give effect to both 
individual (i.e. through consent) and communal interests (i.e. through the listed exceptions), so the 
argument goes, the Act, in fact, does neither, and thus is a confused and incoherent piece of law.94 As 
noted in the literature, a lack of clarity can be extremely damaging to the efficiency and legitimacy of 
any regulatory regime.95 Accordingly, this is a pitfall it will be important for any PMDD regulatory 
framework to avoid. 
5.4. Criminal liability 
Both the HTA and the UAGA outline numerous criminal offences that can be committed via the 
inappropriate handling of bodily material, misrepresentation of consent/authorisation, and various 
other behaviours. Though the HTA is more extensive than the UAGA and articulates a wider range of 
offences, both regimes clearly envisage criminal penalties as an appropriate means of redress for non-
compliance. The question that naturally stems from this, therefore, is whether a regulatory framework 
for PMDD should also operate on such a basis. In other words, should non-compliance with such a 
framework, for instance via the inappropriate handling of the data of a deceased person, result in 
criminal liability? If the mishandling of bodily material is deserving of criminal sanction due to the way 
in which they are intrinsically linked to an individual’s personhood and identity then arguably the 
answer is yes. After all, personal data can be described in the same way, and thus their mishandling 
post-death should arguably be treated similarly. 
Perhaps in correlation with this manner of thought, the UK’s recently enacted Data Protection Act 
2018 contains some novel and bespoke criminal offences relating to inappropriate treatment of 
individuals’ personal data. Section 171 of the Act, for instance, introduces a new offence that will be 
committed when a defendant knowingly or recklessly de-anonymises anonymised data without the 
consent of the data controller responsible for the anonymisation.96 If the trend of using criminal law 
as a means of resolving data protection issues is to continue, then perhaps it would make sense for a 
PMDD regulatory framework to be underpinned by criminal penalties. However, this would require 
careful thought. Though the use of criminal law in this context might be prima facie appealing it is a 
possibility that is inherently problematic. As noted elsewhere, the use of criminal law requires clear 
and precise legal norms that are often not available in data protection. Data protection crimes also 
face competition from “normal” crimes (e.g. theft, assault, criminal damage etc.) for enforcement 
resources, and their prioritisation is perhaps doubtful. A lack of technological expertise on the part of 
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law enforcement bodies and the judiciary would also likely lead to a muddled approach and 
unsatisfactory results.97 
 
6. Conclusion: beyond ethics - the law of posthumous data donation? 
 
In this section, we make some tentative suggestions for legislative/policy reforms that would enable 
the practice of PMDD. Our recommendations would make the law regarding access to health records 
by researchers more coherent. Before venturing into that discussion, we summarise the main findings 
of this paper, so to clarify the bases for our suggestions.  
 
In principle, the legal treatment of personal data of living and the deceased individuals, including 
patients’ records, is not based on property and ownership, but rather, protection is offered through 
general data protection regimes, sector-specific data protection regimes, and the doctor/patient duty 
of confidence. General data protection regimes do not apply to deceased individuals in either of the 
analysed countries. In terms of sector-specific laws, the US system appears clearer and more 
conducive to PMDD, with some discrepancies at the state level. The HIPAA offers options for 
researchers to access PHI of the deceased, unlike English law where the permissibility of such access 
is unclear from sector-specific legislation. General data protection rules do not apply to the deceased, 
so the research exemption outlined in the GDPR similarly does not apply. The NHS Act offers more 
clarity, but the use of deceased’s medical data can be trumped by her consent for use for other specific 
purposes. This, unfortunately, has not been developed further in the policy. Doctor to patient 
confidentiality seems to extend beyond death in England, so this, in principle, is capable of preventing 
disclosure of medical data and patient records. The 2002 Regulations allow for the duty of confidence 
to be set aside in certain situations, but this can be further trumped by the deceased’s consent or her 
opt-out. Therefore, it seems necessary to amend the existing legislation and policies in order to 
provide for a clear PMDD framework. An analysis of the regulatory position regarding organ donation 
helps to cast light on how best to develop such a framework but also reveals a number of pitfalls and 
challenges that such a framework would have to avoid and negotiate. In particular, questions relating 
to the role of the individual (and the need for their consent), the scope of such a framework, its 
exceptions, and the utilisation of criminal law, could all prove to be problematic.   
 
In order to make the possibility of PMDD clear and coherent in English law, the following key 
amendments would be required. In particular, The Access to Health Records Act 1990 and the Public 
Records Act 1958 would need to at least mention PMDD, so to enable access for research purposes 
with the deceased’s consent. At present, under general data protection law, consent is not required, 
since the deceased is not data subjects according to the DPA 2018. This position would require 
adjustment. Consent should be also introduced through ethical codes, such as the Code for 
Posthumous Medical Data Donation mentioned in section 1.98 One possibility is to align such consents 
with a standard commensurate with that used by data protection and organ donation legislation, so 
that the deceased’s consent, expressed pre-mortem, must be freely given, informed and 
unambiguous, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, whereby an individual signifies 
agreement with PMDD. This is in line with article 4(11) of GDPR, though it omits the word ‘specific’ if 
the deceased chooses to donate their data for any research purpose, as long as it is for non-
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commercial research. The Access to Health Records Act 1990 should be amended to allow for access 
by researchers when permitted by the deceased or their personal representative. Amendments to the 
NHS Act along these lines would also be helpful, and the option for PMDD should be clearly set out. 
This would not affect the common law duty of confidence, as the option would include the deceased’s 
consent. In America, HIPAA could be amended to include PMDD as well. In order to clarify ethical 
processes, HIPAA could also state explicatively that further consent from the next of kin or personal 
representative is not required in the case of PMDD.   
Another idea would be to look at PMDD more holistically and for the Secretary of State for Health to 
introduce separate regulations for the UK, which would amend the relevant laws and set out the 
general principles of PMDD, including the recognition of ethical codes and the NHS policies. If this 
option was pursued, the questions considered above in section 5 would be highly pertinent. Careful 
thought would, for instance, need to be given to questions relating to whether donation would only 
be permitted in respect of certain purposes (e.g. for commercial, rather than non-commercial, 
purposes), whether and in what situations a relative or proxy could give consent on behalf of the 
deceased and in what circumstances, and whether it would be possible to consent to the donation of 
some data whilst excluding other types. In a similar vein, questions regarding the utilisation of criminal 
law, and whether, and in what circumstances, criminal penalties should be levied against those 
mishandling health data post-mortem also may require address.   
One final question that is of a technical, rather than legal, nature, relates to how a PMDD regulatory 
framework could be operated from a technological perspective. In other words, what technologies 
could be used, or would be needed, to underpin and support a regulatory framework for PMDD? To 
this end, it has been suggested that democratically controlled non-profit personal data cooperatives 
may help to establish a governance and trust framework for data sharing and data donation.99 In a 
similar vein specific technological tools, such as personal data stores, as mechanisms which allow 
individuals to control their personal data transactions, may also have the potential to contribute to 
the achievement of this objective.100 Whatever technology, or technologies, are ultimately used to 
help facilitate PMDD, however, challenges pertaining to standardisation and interoperability, digital 
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literacy, scalability, fair competition and cybersecurity will all likely need to be wrestled with.101 There 
may also be other underlying ethical concerns associated with the use of technology in this context.102 
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